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Among the various versions of the twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) protocol
[M.Lucamarini, Z. Yuan, J. Dynes, and A. Shields, Nature (London) 557, 400 (2018)] that can
overcome the rate-distance limit, the TF-QKD without phase postselection proposed by Cui et al.
[Phys. Rev. Appl. 11, 034053 (2019)] is an elegant TF-QKD that can provide high key rates
since the postselection of global phases has been removed. However, the achievable distance of this
variant is shorter than that of the original phase-matching QKD [X. Ma, P. Zeng, and H. Zhou,
Phys. Rev. X 8, 031043 (2018)]. In this paper, we propose a method for improving its perfor-
mance by introducing an additional decoy mode. The upper bound of the information leakage can
be more tightly estimated; hence, both the key rate and the achievable distance are significantly
improved. Interestingly, the operation of the proposed additional decoy mode is the same as that of
the code mode; hence, it does not introduce difficulties into the experimental system. In addition,
the improvement is substantial with finite decoy states, which is meaningful in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] enables two re-
mote users, who we call Alice and Bob, to share se-
cret random keys with information-theoretic security [2–
5] that is guaranteed by principles of quantum physics,
even if there is an eavesdropper, who we call Eve.
With the developments of QKDs in both theory and
experiment, QKD implementations with longer achiev-
able distance [6, 7] and higher secret key rate(SKR)
[8–10] were realized. However, all these implementa-
tions must obey limits on the SKR as a function of
the channel transmittance [11, 12], which are called re-
peaterless bounds. Surprisingly, a recently proposed
protocol, namely, twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) [13] and
its variants, e.g., phase-matching QKD(PM-QKD) [14],
sending-or-not QKD [15] and no phase post-selection TF-
QKD(NPP-TFQKD) [16–18], can overcome this bound;
hence, the performance of QKDs can be significantly im-
proved. In addition, these protocols have been proven
to be immune to all potential side-channel attacks on
the measurement device, like the measurement-device-
independent protocol [19–23].
In the original TF-QKD and PM-QKD, Alice (Bob)
encodes a key bit as the phase of the weak coherent
pulse, adds an additional random phase αA (αB), and
sends it to an untrusted middle station, namely, Char-
lie, who interferes with the incoming pulses to measure
the phase difference between them. Upon receiving the
message from the middle station, Alice and Bob publicly
announce the values of αA and αB and post-select the tri-
als that satisfy αA ≈ αB to generate secret key bits. The
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post-selection of αA ≈ αB inevitably degrades the SKR
and complicates the postprocessing. For overcoming this
problem, Cui et al. proposed NPP-TFQKD [16]. Soon
after, two other groups independently proposed similar
schemes [17, 18]. In [16], Alice(Bob) randomly selects
two different modes. The first mode runs without adding
random phase αA (αB) and can be used to generate a key
bit. The latter is used to monitor the security. Remov-
ing the phase randomization and the post-selection from
the code mode observably improves the secure key rate.
However, its achievable distance is much shorter than
that of PM-QKD.
In this work, we explain why the achievable distance is
shorter compared with PM-QKD and propose a practical
method for improving the performance of NPP-TFQKD
substantially. Our work is mainly based [16] and the core
strategy of our method is to introduce an additional de-
coy mode into the NPP-TFQKD protocol that is run with
the same phase as code mode and can estimate tightly
the information leakage, which is denoted as IAE . As a
result, the achievable distance is increased.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In Sec.II, we briefly review the procedure of NPP-
TFQKD and its method for calculating the upper bound
of IAE from [16]. In Sec.III, we introduce our new
method, which simultaneously maintains the superior-
ity of the higher SKR, longer distance and practicability.
In Sec.IV, the simulation results are presented, which
demonstrate the superior performance of our method.
The details of our method and derivations can be found
in the appendix.
2II. TF-QKD WITHOUT PHASE POST
SELECTION
The process of NPP-TFQKD is described as follows:
Step 1. Preparation and measurement: Alice
and Bob randomly select code mode or decoy mode. If
code mode is selected, Alice (Bob) prepares a phase-
locked weak coherent pulse (WCP) |√µ〉 and randomly
modulates the 0 or pi phase that corresponds to the raw
key bit 0 or 1, respectively. If the decoy mode is selected,
they prepare a phase-randomized WCP with an inten-
sity that is selected from a pre-specified set at random.
Then, they send the modulated quantum state to Charlie
for interference. Since the randomized phase in the de-
coy mode is never publicly announced, we assume Alice
and Bob prepare a mixed state in photon number space
assume
ρω1 ⊗ ρω2 =
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
n=0
(pω1m |m〉〈m|) ⊗ (pω2n |n〉〈n|), (1)
where ω1 and ω2 denote, respectively, the intensity cho-
sen by Alice and Bob, and pωn = e
−ωωn/n!.
Step 2. Announcement: For each trial, Charlie
must publicly announce the detector (L or R) that clicks
or a non-click event.
Step 3. Sifting: Alice and Bob repeat the above
steps many times to collect sufficiently many click events.
Then, they publicly announce which trials are conducted
in code mode and which are conducted in decoy mode.
For the trials, they both choose code mode and Charlie
announces a click event (L or R clicked); the raw key
bits are generated. Bob must flip his bit if Charlie’s an-
nouncement is ’R’.
Step 4. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob esti-
mate the gain of code mode Qcµµ, namely, the probability
of a click event for each trial in code mode, and the gains
in decoy mode. For decoy mode, we denote the gains
as Qdω1ω2 , which corresponds to the probability of a click
event conditioned on Alice and Bob preparing ρω1 ⊗ ρω2.
In decoy mode, we also define the yield of Fock states
(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |n〉〈n|) as Ym,n. The relation between them is
expressed as
Qω1ω2 =
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
n=0
pω1m p
ω2
n Ym,n, (2)
where Qω1ω2 and p
ω1(ω2)
n(m) can be experimentally observed.
From these gains, Alice and Bob can calculate the up-
per bound on the information leakage, which is denoted
as IAE .
Step 5. Key distillation: Alice and Bob generate
their secure key by applying error correction and privacy
amplification to the sifted key. The SKR is expressed as
R = Qcµµ[1− fH(Ec)− IAE ], (3)
where H(p) = −plog2p−(1−p)log2(1−p) is the Shannon
entropy.
In [16], IAE depends on |γn,m〉, which is defined as the
state of Eve’s ancilla if Alice and Bob send Fock states
|n〉 and |m〉, respectively. Defining E = {0, 2, 4, ....} and
O = {1, 3, 5, ....} as even and odd sets, respectively, the
relation between IAE and |γn,m〉 is as follows:
IAE ≤ h(
∣∣|ψee〉
∣∣2
Qcµµ
,
∣∣|ψoe〉
∣∣2
Qcµµ
) + h(
∣∣|ψoo〉
∣∣2
Qcµµ
,
∣∣|ψeo〉
∣∣2
Qcµµ
), (4)
where h(x, y) = −x log2 x− y log2 y + (x+ y) log2(x+ y)
and
|ψee〉 =
∑
n∈E,m∈E
√
pµnp
µ
mYn,m|γn,m〉,
|ψoe〉 =
∑
n∈O,m∈E
√
pµnp
µ
mYn,m|γn,m〉,
|ψoo〉 =
∑
n∈O,m∈O
√
pµnp
µ
mYn,m|γn,m〉,
|ψeo〉 =
∑
n∈E,m∈O
√
pµnp
µ
mYn,m|γn,m〉.
(5)
The subscript e (o) denotes that the photon-number n or
m belongs to set E (O).
The main challenging is bounding
∣∣|ψxy〉
∣∣2(x, y ∈
{o, e}). Since the values of inner product
〈γn,m|γk,l〉(m,n 6= k, l) are unknown, what we can
make sure are the constraints given by:
xee ,
∣∣|ψee〉
∣∣2 6 ∣∣
∑
n∈E,m∈E
√
pµnp
µ
mYn,m
∣∣2,
xoe ,
∣∣|ψoe〉
∣∣2 6 ∣∣
∑
n∈O,m∈E
√
pµnp
µ
mYn,m
∣∣2,
xoo ,
∣∣|ψoo〉
∣∣2 6 ∣∣
∑
n∈O,m∈O
√
pµnp
µ
mYn,m
∣∣2,
xeo ,
∣∣|ψeo〉
∣∣2 6 ∣∣
∑
n∈E,m∈O
√
pµnp
µ
mYn,m
∣∣2,
xee + xoe + xoo + xeo = Q
c
µµ.
(6)
The upper bound IAE can be obtained by maximizing
the objective equation
IAE = max : h(
xee
Qcµµ
,
xoe
Qcµµ
) + h(
xoo
Qcµµ
,
xeo
Qcµµ
) (7)
without violating the constraints in Eq.(6).
A very interesting and meaningful question is whether
the above bound on IAE can be tightened.
III. METHOD TO IMPROVE THE DISTANCE
OF NPP-TFQKD
According to the constraints in Eq.(6), we posit that
IAE is bounded loosely. Let’s consider the upper bound
3of
∣∣|ψee〉
∣∣2 as an example. Defining qn,m = pµnpµmYn,m,∣∣|ψee〉
∣∣2 can be regarded as two parts:
∣∣|ψee〉
∣∣2 = ∣∣
n∈E,m∈E∑
n,m
√
qn,m|γn,m〉
∣∣2 = Ωµee +Φµee, (8)
where
Ωµµee =
n∈E,m∈E∑
n,m
qn,m〈γn,m|γn,m〉 =
n∈E,m∈E∑
n,m
qn,m (9)
represents sum of the inner products whose subscripts of
bra and ket are the same, and
Φµµee =
n,k∈E,m,l∈E∑
n,m,k,l>m
√
qn,mqk,l(〈γn,m|γk,l〉+ 〈γk,l|γn,m〉)
(10)
represents the remaining inner products, whose sub-
scripts of bra and ket are different. We refer to Ωee and
Φee as the non-cross term and the cross term, respec-
tively.
Since 〈γn,m|γk,l〉+ 〈γk,l|γn,m〉 = 2Re(〈γn,m|γk,l〉) must
be a real number in the range of [−2, 2], the original up-
per bound is estimated too loosely since Eq.(6) replaces
all 〈γn,m|γk,l〉+ 〈γk,l|γn,m〉 by 2, which is the worst case.
However, if Charlie is honest, his interference measure-
ment preserves the orthogonality between Fock states,
from which 〈γn,m|γk,l〉+ 〈γk,l|γn,m〉 = 0 follows directly.
Thus, this replacement may severely degrade SKR if the
channel loss is large, which is the main reason why the
distance of NPP-TFQKD is shorter than that of PM-
QKD. It is natural to consider whether there is any
method for estimating IAE more tightly while preserv-
ing the practicability of the protocol. Fortunately, the
answer is yes.
By observing Eq.(2) and the fifth constraint condition
in Eq.(6), we can find the gains of code mode and decoy
mode are very different, since the phase randomization
in decoy mode eliminates all cross terms. Concretely, we
can see
Qdω1ω2 = Ω
ω1ω2
ee +Ω
ω1ω2
eo +Ω
ω1ω2
oe +Ω
ω1ω2
oo
Qcω1ω2 = Q
d
ω1ω2
+Φω1ω2ee +Φ
ω1ω2
eo +Φ
ω1ω2
oe +Φ
ω1ω2
oo
(11)
By defining
yn,m,k,l = (〈γn,m|γk,l〉+ 〈γk,l|γn,m〉)
√
Yn,mYk,l, (12)
we obtain a new linear equation in terms of yn,m,k,l:
Qcω1ω2 −Qdω1ω2 =
A,B∈{O,E}∑
A,B
l>m∑
n,k∈A,m,l∈B
√
pω1n p
ω2
m p
ω1
k p
ω2
l yn,m,k,l
(13)
Similar to the principle of the infinite decoy state
method [24–26], we can obtain infinite linear equations
that are similar to Eq.(13) if infinite intensities in both
code and decoy modes are applied. By solving these
infinite linear equations, all yn,m,k,l can be obtained in
principle. In the ideal scenario, in which Charlie is hon-
est, Qcω1ω2 − Qdω1ω2 = 0 should be satisfied for any in-
tensities ω1 and ω2. To satisfy these infinite equations,
yn,m,k,l = 0 must hold, namely, the cross term Φ
ω1ω2
ee in
Eq.(8) must be zero. As a result, tighter estimation of
IAE and a higher SKR are expected.
To introduce the linear equations such as Eq.(13) into
the NPP-TFQKD protocol, one must monitor the gains
of various intensities with the same phase in code mode.
For this and to avoid ambiguity, we modify Step 1 and
Step 4 of NPP-TFQKD as follows:
To introduce the linear equations like Eq.(13) in
NPP-TFQKD protocol, one must monitor the gain of
various intensities with the same phase of code mode.
For this and avoiding ambiguity, we modify the Step.1
and Step.4 of NPP-TFQKD as follows.
New Step 1. Preparation and measurement:
Alice and Bob randomly choose decoy mode 1, decoy
mode 2 or code mode. If code mode is selected,
Alice (Bob) prepares a phase-locked WCP |√µ〉 and
randomly modulates the 0 or pi phase that corresponds
to raw key bit 0 or 1, respectively. If decoy mode
1 is selected, they prepare a phase-randomized WCP
and randomly choose an intensity from a pre-specified
set I1. If decoy mode 2 is selected, Alice (Bob)
prepares a phase-locked WCP |√ω〉, in which the
intensity ω is chosen from a pre-specified set I2 at
random. The quantum state of decoy mode 2 shares the
same phase as WCP in code mode and I2 is a subset of I1.
New Step 4. Parameter estimation: Alice and
Bob estimate the gain of code mode Qcµµ, namely, the
probability of a click event for each trial in code mode,
and the gains of decoy modes 1 and 2. For decoy mode
1, we denote the gain as Qd1ω1ω2 , which corresponds to the
probability of a click event conditioned on Alice and Bob
preparing ρω1 ⊗ ρω2 in decoy mode 1. For decoy mode 2,
we denote the gain as Qd2ω1ω2 , which corresponds to the
probability of a click event conditioned on Alice and Bob
preparing |√ω1〉 and |√ω2〉, respectively, in decoy mode
2. From these gains, Alice and Bob can calculate the up-
per bound on the information leakage IAE . The method
of calculating IAE will be detailed in the appendix.
With the new step 1 and step 4, we have proposed an
improved NPP-TFQKD.
4IV. SIMULATION OF THE IMPROVED
NPP-TFQKD
A. Infinite decoy states
To evaluate the performance of our improved NPP-
TFQKD, we simulate its SKR with infinite decoy states,
namely, the sets I1 and I2 are both infinite; hence, Yn,m
is calculated precisely and yn,m,k,l = 0. The simulation
model can be found in the appendix of Ref. [16] and
the parameters that are used in the simulation are listed
in Tab.(I). The results of the simulation are plotted in
Fig.(1), according to which the proposed improved pro-
tocol realizes higher SKR and longer communication dis-
tance.
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FIG. 1. Secret key rates in logarithmic scale as functions of
the distance for various protocols with infinite decoy states.
The blue solid line and red dash-dot line correspond to,
respectively, our improved method and the original NPP-
TFQKD. The purple dashed line corresponds to PM-QKD.
The yellow dotted line corresponds to the repeaterless bound
that was proposed in [12]; here, we refer to it as the linear
bound.
TABLE I. simulation parameters of several kinds of TF-QKD.
pdc
a ηd
b fc fiber loss Md
8× 10−8 14.5% 1.15 0.2 dB/km 16
a Pdc denotes the dark count rate
b ηd denotes the detection efficiency
c f denotes the correction efficiency
d M denotes phase post selection slice number in PM-QKD
B. finite decoy states
The infinite decoy state method is not useful in prac-
tice. In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of
applying 5-intensity decoy mode 1 and 4-intensity decoy
mode 2. The intensity of code mode is denoted by µ. The
4 intensities of decoy mode 2 are µ, ν1, ν2 and o. Decoy
mode 1 has an additional intensity, which is denoted by
µ3. The parameters are listed in Tab.(I). Compared with
the original NPP-TFQKD with four decoy state intensi-
ties (red solid line), both the SKR and the achievable
distance are improved substantially. The details will be
introduced in the appendix.
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FIG. 2. Secret key rates in logarithmic scale as functions of
the distance for various practical protocols. The blue solid line
corresponds to our improved method with 5-intensity decoy
mode 1 and 4-intensity decoy mode 2. The red dash-dot line
corresponds to the original NPP-TFQKD with 4 decoy states.
The yellow dotted line represents the linear bound that was
proposed in [12]. The original NPP-TFQKD requires only
code mode and decoy mode. The intensity µ (the first decoy
state and the code state) is an optimized value. Other decoy
intensities, namely, ν1, ν2 and o, are fixed to 0.005, 0.002 and
0, respectively. For our improved protocol, the intensity µ is
an optimized value. ν1, ν2 and o are set to the same values as
above. The additional intensity µ3 of decoy mode 1 is fixed
to 1.3.
It is worth noting that, The estimation of cross terms
relies on the accuracy of Y m,n. To estimate the high-
order Y m,n(m+n ≥ 4) more tightly, we add an intensity
that is larger than the code mode intensity into decoy
mode 1.
V. DISCUSSION
During the submission of our work, we found that the
test states in other work [27] are very similar to decoy
5mode 2. To help readers understand the variants of TF-
QKD, we will briefly discuss Ref. [16–18, 27] and com-
pare our work with ref. [27] with the same parameters
and number of intensities.
The protocols in Ref. [16, 17] are highly similar; both
of them have higher SKR but much shorter achievable
distance compared with PM-QKD. In the similar scheme
that was proposed by Ref. [18], the achievable distance
is increased by using infinite test states, which include
infinite intensities and infinite phase modulation. The
achievable distance is the same as that of PM-QKD but
the infinite phase modulation for each intensity is not
feasible in practice. Our method divides each of the in-
tensities into only two modes: a phase-randomized mode,
namely, decoy mode 1, and a phase-locked mode, namely,
decoy mode 2; this approach is more feasible than infinite
phase modulation. Our method also reaches the distance
realized by PM-QKD.
In Ref. [27], the finite test state method was proposed.
The method renders the protocol in [18] useful in prac-
tice. Their method requires several test states for esti-
mating the parameters and two key states for generating
key bits (the two key states are also used for parameter
estimation). We consider their six-test-state method as
an example. The method requires six test states and two
key states, which include four intensities and eight phase
modulations in total. According to Fig.6(ii) of [27], the
protocol reaches 75 dB total loss with 5×10−8 dark-count
rate, 85% detection efficiency and 1.5% misalignment.
We simulate our protocol with the same parameters, 4-
intensity decoy mode 1 and 4-intensity decoy mode 2.
The results demonstrate that our protocol achieves a to-
tal loss of 94 dB.
Both this work and Ref. [27] have advantages and dis-
advantages. For our protocol, the phase randomization
in [0, pi] in the decoy mode renders the system more com-
plicated and may limit the repetition rate. Nevertheless,
the phase randomization in our protocol does not assume
the precision of phase modulation if the phase is random.
For the approach in [27], one need only realize a small
number of phase modulations; however, these phase mod-
ulations are assumed to be very precise. For instance, the
six test states in [27] must modulate eight phases accu-
rately, which introduces difficulties into the phase mod-
ulation system and may also limit the repetition rate of
experiments. Using 4 intensities, our achievable distance
is longer under the same conditions; however, the semi-
definite programming method that was proposed by [27]
is more novel and general.
In summary, we proposed a practically useful method
that overcomes the disadvantages of NPP-TFQKD. By
adding decoy mode 2, we obtain additional constraints
that enable us to estimate IAE tighter. The main strat-
egy behind our method is that the inner products of the
quantum states of Eve’s system can be well estimated via
the proposed protocol, whereas the previous protocol as-
sumes that these inner products attain the worst possible
value. This work improves the communication distance
substantially. According to the result of the simulation,
our method of 5 intensities in decoy mode 1 and 4 intensi-
ties in decoy mode 2 is close to the infinite decoy state of
PM-QKD in terms of the communication distance, while
the advantage of phase post-selection not being required
is retained.
Experimentally, the manipulation of decoy mode 2 is
similar to that of code mode and the random intensities
are a subset of decoy mode 1. Thus, our modification
does not introduce any additional difficulties into the ex-
perimental system.
Our method analyzes why the upper bound on the
information leakage in [16] is too loose and provides a
tighter bound such that the achievable distance reaches
those of PM-QKD and [18]. We also propose the finite
decoy state method, which renders the protocol useful in
practice.
Some problems remain to be solved, such as the finite
size key effect and the protocol with imperfect devices.
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Appendix A: improved NPP-TFQKD with finite
decoy-state
In this section, we will describe how to estimate a tight
bound of IAE with a finite decoy state in detail. The
overline and underline denote upper and lower bounds,
respectively. According to Ref. [16], the key step of
Eq.(7) is the estimation of constraints on xee, xeo, xoe
and xoo. In the original protocol, the constraints are
specified as Eq.(6), which are too loose. By introducing
decoy mode 2, tighter constraints can be obtained. Let’s
consider xee as an example:
Ωµµee +Φ
µµ
ee 6 xee 6 Ω
µµ
ee +Φ
µµ
ee , (A1)
where
Ω
µµ
ee =
∑
n∈E,m∈E
pµnp
µ
mY n,m, (A2)
and
Ωµµee =
∑
n∈E,m∈E
pµnp
µ
mY n,m, (A3)
6where Y nm in Eq.(A2)(Y nm in Eq.(A3) ) can be esti-
mated via linear programming, as shown in the appendix
of Ref. [16].
The bounds of Φµµee are estimated via linear program-
ming. The upper bound is as follows:
max : Φµµee =
l>m∑
n,k∈E,m,l∈E
√
pµnp
µ
mp
µ
kp
µ
l yn,m,k,l
s.t. :
Qcω1ω2 −Qdω1ω2 =
A,B∈{O,E}∑
A,B
l>m∑
n,k∈A,m,l∈B
√
pω1n p
ω2
m p
ω1
k p
ω2
l yn,m,k,l,
yn,m,k,l ∈ [−2
√
Y n,mY k,l, 2
√
Y n,mY k,l],
ω1, ω2 ∈ {µ, ν1, ν2, o},
(A4)
where yn,m,k,l is the variable of the objective function.
By adjusting yn,m,k,l without violating the constraint
functions, we obtain the maximum value of the objec-
tive function, which is the upper bound of Φµµee .
Similarly, by modifying the objective function to
min: Φµµee =
l>m∑
n,k∈E,m,l∈E
√
pµnp
µ
mp
µ
kp
µ
l yn,m,k,l, (A5)
the lower bound of Φµµee can be estimated.
Since ω1, ω2 ∈ {µ, ν1, ν2, o}, there are 16 constraints
in the linear programming equation in total. By solving
Eq.(A4), the upper bound of Φµµee is obtained. Φ
µµ
eo , Φ
µµ
oe
and Φ
µµ
oo can be obtained similarly.
After all Ω and Φ have been estimated, the constraints
of Eq.(7) is reexpressed as
Ωµµee +Φ
µµ
ee 6 xee 6 Ω
µµ
ee +Φ
µµ
ee ,
Ωµµeo +Φ
µµ
oe 6 xoe 6 Ω
µµ
oe +Φ
µµ
oe ,
Ωµµeo +Φ
µµ
eo 6 xeo 6 Ω
µµ
eo +Φ
µµ
eo ,
Ωµµoo +Φ
µµ
oo 6 xoo 6 Ω
µµ
oo +Φ
µµ
oo ,
xee + xoe + xoo + xeo = Q
c
µµ.
(A6)
By applying the new constraints Eq.(A6) in Eq.(7), a
tighter bound IAE is obtained and improved performance
of NPP-TFQKD can be expected.
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